Public law and the autonomy of the political: a material critique by Wilkinson, Michael
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063210 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences 
Research Network electronic library at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063210 
© Michael A. Wilkinson. Users may download and/or print one copy to facilitate their private 
study or for non-commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of this 
material or use it for any profit-making activities or any other form of commercial gain. 
 
 
 
 
Public Law and the Autonomy of  the Political: 
A Material Critique  
 
 
Michael A. Wilkinson 
Forthcoming in M. Wilkinson and M. Dowdle (eds.) Questioning the Foundations 
of Public Law (Hart Publishing, 2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 17/2017 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Law Department 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063210 
 
 
 
 
Public Law and the Autonomy of  the Political:  
A Material Critique  
 
 
 
Michael A. Wilkinson * 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Modern public law, according to Martin Loughlin’s Foundations of Public law, 
depends upon the autonomy of the political realm. This is explained on the basis of an 
orthodox secularisation thesis of modernity, the autonomy of the political emerging 
through its successful separation from the theological. But when viewed in relation to 
the economic (the material realm), the autonomy of political ordering looks more 
fragile, subject to the continuing struggle between democracy and capitalism. The 
concrete features of this struggle are explored by way of a stylised diachronic overview 
of the transformation of the Western European state and regional state-system in the 
twentieth century, first with the interwar breakdown of political order, then with 
postwar reconstruction in the project of European integration. In the recent Euro-
crisis phase it again enters a critical period. All of this, however, escapes the lens of a 
purely political jurisprudence.    
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 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The conceptual history outlined in Martin Loughlin’s Foundations of Public Law 
depends for its concrete success on the modern European state of the ‘long 19th 
century’ (the period from the French Revolution to the First World War). Central 
to this reconstruction is the idea of the ‘autonomy of the political realm’. This is 
largely accounted for by an orthodox secularisation thesis of modernity, claiming 
the autonomy of the political from the theological domain. Loughlin advances his 
own account of the foundations of public law by insisting, persuasively, that 
secularisation does not mean sheer legal positivisation. Public law does not 
become freestanding or self-executing through its modernisation: it depends upon 
a political order to sustain it. This political order, or more accurately, the process 
of political ordering (to convey its dynamic quality) is conceptualised in the 
language of droit politique (political right) or, as in the opening chapter to this 
collection, ‘political jurisprudence’. Political ordering stands in an internal relation 
to the positive law; this is by no means a straightforward coupling, it is a complex 
and potentially fraught relation. But secularisation does clear the way for a 
prudential science of political right, a ‘pure theory’ of public law, – and all the 
difficulties that come with reconciling the claim to prudential and scientific logics.1 
But what does the autonomy of the political look like if viewed in relation 
to the economic, rather than the religious worldview? How does the political 
ordering of public law stand in relation to the material reproduction of society? It 
might be said that political jurisprudence supposes a relative autonomy from this 
realm as well. There is no autonomy of the political if, for example, political power 
is determined by economic power or specific class interests; if the political is a 
mere super-structural reflection of a material base, to adopt the Marxian 
metaphor. The autonomy of the political requires that the governing relationship 
in the modern state does not rest on the explicit fusion of political and economic 
power: it is the autonomy of the political from the economic that sustains the 
authority and legitimacy of the ruling relationship, and distinguishes modern 
statehood from previous political forms.2  
Loughlin is occasionally explicit about this, if less in Foundations than 
elsewhere in his work. Political relationships, he notes, cannot be reduced to 
socio-economic relations, political power is not reducible to economic power, 
political office is not based on property rights, subjects are to be considered 
‘citizens’ rather than ‘labourers, capitalists, or bourgeoisie’, and so on.3   
                                                      
1 See also Panu Minkinnen, this volume.  
2 For extended discussion, see E Wood, From Lords to Citizens: A Social History of Western Political Thought 
(London, Verso, 2011). 
3 See M Loughlin, ‘Political Jurisprudence’, this volume, and earlier, e.g. ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’ in N 
Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford, Hart, 2003).  
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But what kind of claims are these? This autonomy, even ‘primacy’, of the 
political over the economic is asserted by way of conceptual stipulation, rather than 
explained through any historical reconstruction. Unlike the autonomy of the 
political from the theological realm, Loughlin does not offer even a brief narrative 
of their relation; he gives no account, for example, of how political power is 
separated from economic power or how this is sustained in the modern state. Just 
as significantly, there is no sense of how the political might be threatened, 
subsumed or transformed by - from the other side - an autonomous ‘economic 
realm’ working on the basis of a distinct market logic. The autonomy of the 
political from the economic is instead presupposed; the basic relation between 
political ordering and the reproduction of material social relations is essentially 
implicit in Foundations.4 All, that is, until its closing stages, a point to which we shall 
shortly return. 
A more direct way of putting this is to say that the capitalist state, unlike the 
secular state, the state which distinguishes itself from market (rather than clerical) 
power receives little, if any, attention. The bearing of material questions on the 
process of political ordering takes a back stage: relations between capital and 
labour, debtors and creditors, core and peripheral nations, the role of political 
economic strategies, mercantilism and colonial expansion, the role of taxation and 
control of the money supply – are all avoided. Processes of commodification, and 
the dynamic relation between public political power and private economic power, 
between public goods and private ownership, between solidarity and competition, 
or community and individualism, remain under-examined. Relations of material 
equality and inequality, domestically, and in the uneven and combined 
development of global and regional economic systems, play little or no role in 
explaining the constitution of the modern state and the modern state-system.  
The foundations of public law as presented by Loughlin indeed flatten or 
screen out material social relations, informal hierarchies, and more generally the 
persistence of socio-economic inequalities and class divisions, through the 
employment of terms such as ‘political unity’, ‘the people’ and ‘popular 
sovereignty’, however symbolic or reflexive their reprisal.5 Material relations are 
also flattened out geo-politically, in a world order sustained through the sovereign 
equality of states, rather than through imperialism, colonialism, or other forms of 
domination within and between states or regional organisations. The state is the 
unity of an undifferentiated multitude in this vision; political ordering is the 
process of achieving a (symbolic) juristic unity.  
                                                      
4 These dual stories of differentiation of the political from the theological on the one hand, and the 
economic on the other, might of course themselves be inter-connected, in the relationship between 
secularisation and capitalism from the Reformation through the protestant work ethic, as outlined by 
Max Weber. But there is nothing to suggest that Loughlin endorses this Weberian story and Weber 
does not feature heavily in Foundations. 
5 See Loughlin, ‘Political Jurisprudence’, this volume.  
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This absence gives political jurisprudence a formalistic character, despite 
drawing on an extraordinarily rich array of sources. There are, we are told, always 
‘rulers and ruled’; but we are never told how relative positions of ruling power are 
obtained, contested, or changed, and what the role of public law is in establishing, 
maintaining or contesting them. We are told that public law provides a rule-based 
guide to the management of conflict; and that conflict will never be fully or finally 
resolved. But the account of underlying conflict is essentially Hobbesian - abstract 
rather than historicised, based on an irreconcilable contest intrinsic to human 
nature rather than material inequalities, social hierarchies, class divisions, inter-
state domination or imperial rivalries.6  
In other words, the political economy of the modern state and state-
system, unlike its political secularity, is irrelevant or only marginally relevant for 
framing political jurisprudence, a kind of irritant which can be kept external to 
political ordering. Although Loughlin hints at an exception to this elision - 
beginning with the Rousseauvian imperative to avoid ‘extreme inequality of 
fortunes’,7 and continuing in Hegel’s concern with the inequalities produced by the 
workings of natural law in civil society, 8 the theme of inequality remains marginal 
in Foundations and is certainly not structural.  
But why might this be considered theoretically problematic rather than 
merely a choice of emphasis? After all, even within the Marxist tradition, the 
juridico-political life of the capitalist state has come to be recognised as relatively 
autonomous, if in the last instance determined by the material base.9 Another way 
of putting the question is to ask what does the presupposition of the (relative) 
autonomy of the political from the economic conceal? 
Two related responses to this question can be given at the outset because 
they inform the chapter as a whole. The first goes to the dynamic quality of the 
ruling relationship, a relationship that is central to Loughlin’s juristic point of view. 
If material social relations can be marginalised in a political order which is 
characterised by, and depends on, the accepted idea of a particular ruling class or 
fixed arrangement of political power (e.g. aristocracy), they are problematised in an 
order which claims to be democratic in form, which aspires, one might say, to the 
complete interchangeability of rulers and ruled, or to some notion of political 
equality.10 Claude Lefort’s conception of the autonomy of the political, which 
Loughlin leans on, is nothing without the democratic impetus, beginning with the 
bourgeoisie revolutions of popular sovereignty at the end of the 18th century but 
continuing through the struggles for universal suffrage, and in its broader 
distinction with modern totalitarianism into the 20th century. This is because 
                                                      
6 Cf. Anna Yeatman, this volume. 
7 See Foundations, e.g. at 119, 428 
8 See Foundations, e.g. at 349-350 
9 See, especially, N. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London, Verso, 1980).  
10 Loughlin doesn’t spell out what political equality means, but it clearly plays a central conceptual role for 
him. As Halpin notes, this volume, the ‘equality premise’ is problematic, rich and complex, yet under-
theorised by Loughlin.  
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Lefort’s autonomy of the political, the ‘empty place of power’, is underpinned not 
just by secularisation but by the move from absolutism to democracy; it is through 
democracy as a social regime that political indeterminacy is maintained.11  
But does Lefort – and following him, Loughlin - underestimate the role of 
economic power in the material constitution of a society which is not just 
democratic but also capitalist in form, where the empty place of power is in danger 
of being ‘filled’? The suggestion here is that the autonomy of the political on 
which public law rests should be approached less as a one-off rupture, and more 
as a continuous democratic and political struggle for the place of power to remain 
‘empty’– one that is fully material in nature because it has to contend with the 
dynamics of economic (and geo-economic) systems and the inequalities they 
generate. This has only become more pressing in the struggle against the 
increasingly conspicuous inequalities of advanced capitalism in the 21st century and 
new regimes of ‘total market thinking’ that threaten to erode the autonomy of the 
political.12 
The second, related, point speaks to the episodic crises of legitimacy of 
the modern state and state-system. That this might be problematic is evident from 
within Foundations itself, with Loughlin briefly recognising towards the end that 
public law comes under severe strain in the late 20th century with the ‘triumph of 
the social’.13 But what is this a crisis of? Because of the insistence on secularism at 
the start, Loughlin is tempted into claiming that the crisis reflects a return of 
claims to religious truth but now in the form of objective social law; it is this that 
disrupts the interplay of political jurisprudence, threatening the distinctions on 
which public law rests, between state and society, private and public, inside and 
outside the sovereign state.14 Since Foundations is built on the displacement of the 
theological, it is natural to suppose that crisis coincides with its resurfacing.15 But 
is it plausible to suggest that modern crises can be made sense of predominantly in 
terms of the collapse of the dichotomy between public reason and religious truth? 
Is ‘the social’ really just a stand-in for ‘the religious’?  
From a material perspective, the strains on political jurisprudence instead 
arise from the destabilisation of the relation between the political and the 
economic realms, from crises of democratic capitalism. This destabilisation changes, 
or threatens to change, the material constitution of social relations in a way that 
undermines the relative autonomy of the political. Although heightened in critical 
moments, this reflects a general tension, or ‘disequilibrium’, between the logics of 
democracy and capitalism, community and individualism, solidarity and 
                                                      
11 See C. Lefort, ‘The Question of Democracy’, Democracy and Political Theory D. Macey (trans.) 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1988) 9 -20.  
12 See E. Christodoulidis, ‘Total Market Thinking’ (2015) German Law Journal. See also Minkinnen, this 
volume, on the ‘totalitarianism’ of modern capitalism.  
13 Foundations, 461 – 465.  
14 Foundations, 462.  
15 The decisive theoretical figures, again, are Gauchet and Lefort, see Foundations, e.g. 48, 465.  
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competition. This set of material dynamics is central to the process of political 
ordering that political jurisprudence reconstructs.16 Or so it will be argued.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will explore the issue of the 
material foundation of Foundations by asking what grounds the autonomy of the political. 
This is elided by a focus on the secularisation thesis, but is thrown into sharper 
relief by Loughlin’s later turn to Schmitt’s reading of nomos (part 2). Second, I 
explore the possibility - suggested in the threefold order of nomos itself - that the 
autonomy of the political stands in complex, but internal relation, to material 
social reproduction, dependent on, but also threatened by the relative autonomy of the 
economic. Opening up the political-economic relation exposes the material dynamic 
of political ordering, driven by social and political struggles for equality (part 3). 
Next, moving to a diachronic register, I suggest that this relation can also provide 
a cogent account of the periodic crises of public law and the dynamic 
transformation, not only of government, but also of the state itself. This can only 
be touched on here, by examining first a critical period, the interwar breakdown of 
political order (part 4) and then a major realignment of the political-economic 
relation, the post-war reconstitution of the European state in the project of 
European integration, which now again enters a critical phase (part 5). 
  
 
 
II. WHAT GROUNDS THE AUTONOMY OF THE POLITICAL? 
 
The conceptual building blocks of Foundations coincide with the consolidation of 
the nation-state as a sovereign entity in a two-fold manner. Internally, it acquires 
the monopoly of legitimate force, based on secular foundations; in constitutional 
language, ‘we, the people do solemnly ordain’ our political and legal order. 
Externally, the nation-state is recognised as the only legitimate subject of 
international relations, with the right to decide on matters of war and peace, 
subject to conventions regarding civilised warfare, with a European ‘balance of 
power’ consolidated over a longer period, from the early modern nomos in the age 
of absolutism through to the ‘golden age of the classical interstate system’.17  
This is, of course, a simplification of a long and uneven historical process, 
but it crystallises a series of key conceptual distinctions: between international and 
                                                      
16 See e.g. Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Taking Capitalism Seriously: Towards an Institutionalist Approach to 
Contemporary Political Economy’ (2011) 9 Socio-Economic Review, 137 – 167. Loughlin tentatively 
explores a variation of this dynamic through the anthropological work of Christopher Boehm, but this 
naturalises hierarchy and domination and presents the state as essentially egalitarian, Foundations, 196 – 
198.  
17 See B Teschke, ‘Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl Schmitt’s International Legal and Political Theory’ 
(2011) 3 International Theory 179 - 227. Accordingly, the jus publicum europaeum implied a decisive rupture 
not only with divine right, but also with medieval just war theories, grounded in the moral universalism 
of the respublica christiana. 
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domestic, public and private, state and society, the political and the social realms.18 
It culminates in a distinct field of juristic thought, the German tradition of 
Staatslehre at the turn of the century, where the constitution of the state is based on 
a trinity of territory, ruling authority, and people.19 This begins its decline with the 
First World War and is radically problematised with the interwar breakdown of 
liberal constitutionalism and the collapse of the inter-state system, an interregnum 
that will be explored later in more detail.  
But what are the material conditions for the grounding of these 
conceptual distinctions, as well as their eventual effacement? How do they appear 
in ‘social-historical’ perspective? On this, Loughlin appears ambiguous, particularly 
when Foundations is viewed alongside his other work.  
Foundations itself suggests that the crucial rupture on which public law is 
built is immaterial: it is the autonomy–and primacy–of the political from the 
theological-spiritual domain that opens the space for the development of its key 
elements. This move is justified on the basis of Marcel Gauchet’s ‘secularisation 
thesis’ – where modernity is characterized as a process of religious disenchantment 
and the rupture is signalled by the secularisation of the grounds of political 
authority. This is identified and embraced by Loughlin at the very outset of 
Foundations as essential to the project of public law understood as droit politique.20 It 
is the rational, symbolic and ideal that plays the lead role in generating the modern 
constitutional dialectic presented in Foundations, albeit without any Hegelian 
terminus.  
But on the character of the state itself, more than a merely symbolic 
reading is required in order to explain how the concept of the people ‘can 
incorporate some sense of a collective body, conscious of its political existence and 
with the capacity for action.’21 Loughlin equivocates on the nature of this 
embodiment, drawing on Hans Lindahl’s account of reflexive identity, and 
concluding that secular constitutional ordering is dynamic, never static.22 An 
existential unity, which ‘presupposes a mysterious prior substantial equality of the 
people’, is thus replaced with a less reductionist and more ‘relational’ reading of 
the normative power of the factual.23 His purpose is not to offer a new ‘anti-
normativism’ but rather to capture the dialectic of fact and norm in the course of 
constitutional development.24 This even leads the way to a (half-hearted) 
substitution of the Habermasian notion of the ‘public sphere’ for the concept of 
‘the state’.25 Power then can be understood in fairly orthodox liberal fashion as 
                                                      
18 For Loughlin’s own statement see e.g. ‘Ten Tenets of Sovereignty’, above.  
19 See Foundations, 190-196.  
20 Foundations, 6 – 7.  
21 Foundations, 224. Italics added.  
22 Foundations, 226-7.  
23 Foundations, 220 (Jellinek’s phrase). See also, ‘Constituent Power’ in M Dowdle and M Wilkinson (eds.) 
Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 
24 Foundations, 220 – 221.  
25 Foundations, 228 – 231. 
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based on allegiance, or consent, and generated by open, responsible government, 
and even – although Loughlin is careful not to endorse it as such – the notion of 
discourse ethics and the aim (if never the realisation) of something approximating 
rational consensus.26 
The Habermasian reading clearly leads where Loughlin is reluctant to 
follow, to an embrace of a liberal normativism, where the political project of 
constitution-building is a stepping stone to the constitution of a world society, 
albeit based on a multi-level configuration: domestic, regional, international.27 At a 
very basic level, the Habermasian notion of rational consensus would sit 
uncomfortably with Loughlin’s insistence on the stubborn persistence of conflict 
in the human condition. But the broader problem, as I perceive it, is that 
reflexivity on its own does not and cannot account for the historical unity of the 
state, for its existence as a concrete political entity. It cannot account for ‘the 
foundations of Foundations’ at least not in anything other than a purely formal 
sense. In Lindahl’s analytically informed enquiry the state is reduced to just one 
more formal mode of collective association (or self-representation), subject to the 
same paradoxical modalities as any other, rather than representing the dominant 
instantiation of modern political ordering.28 But the modern state for Loughlin is 
central to the foundations of public law.  
Loughlin’s later employment of the figure of nomos as developed by Carl 
Schmitt represents an attempt to firm up this ground. In this quite distinct 
perspective, public law is not founded primarily on the symbolic or the ideal, but 
on a nomos understood in its ancient, spatial, sense as a threefold ‘concrete order’, 
based on an original appropriation (nehmen), then distribution (or division) and 
finally production (or pasturage) of land.29 Together, this signifies the origins and 
source of the material constitution of political authority, sketched diachronically 
across three large-scale historical epochs.30 The jus publicum Europaeum is 
specifically grounded on the second phase of the nomos of the earth, coinciding with 
the maritime ‘discoveries’ made by European peoples and the overcoming of civil 
war internally. This early modern nomos, based on land appropriation, accrual of 
the monopoly of legitimate violence, and a claim to radical title overseas, 
underwrites the foundations of modern public law. It provides nothing less than 
                                                      
26 Foundations, 171, describing Habermas’s route as ‘contentious’ but noting that ‘by maintaining a 
distinction between the generative and distributive aspects of power and between the forms of power 
exhibited in potestas and potentia, his achievement is to have established an intellectual framework that is 
able to incorporate the specificities of political power’. 
27 See J Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge, Polity, 2001). 
28 See H Lindahl, Fault-Lines of Globalisation (Oxford, OUP, 2014).  
29 See M Loughlin, ‘Nomos’ in T Poole and D Dyzenhaus (eds) Theorists of Constitutional Crisis: Oakeshott, 
Hayek and Schmitt on Law, Liberty and State (Cambridge, CUP, 2015) and M. Loughlin, ‘Politonomy’, J 
Meierhenrich and O Simons (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2017) 570 - 592.   
30 It is interesting to note, as Schmitt does, commenting on its use in classical Greece, that nomoi and the 
Aristotelian notion of politiea could be created not only by land division but also by the liquidation of 
debt, see Nomos of the Earth, 68. 
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the social historical conditions for the relative ‘autonomy of the political’, ‘an 
expression of the constituent power to establish order’.31  
Loughlin is candid about this process that begins with a ‘land-grab’; the 
‘original sin’ of constitutional ordering which remains at the foundations of public 
law.32 But, again following Lindahl, Loughlin gives it a reflexive twist: only in 
hindsight, once the second and third orders of nomos (of distribution and 
production) are established, can the original act be identified as having succeeded 
in laying foundations. Again, reflexivity on its own might be a philosophically 
intriguing way of out of a conceptual conundrum, but is substantively empty, 
flattening all instances of political ordering as if there were no specific form of the 
modern state in terms of the material organisation of distribution and production 
of resources in the economy.  
The relation between the symbolic representation of the state inaugurated 
by the rupture of secularisation and the concrete form of the nomos in its material 
development is unclear. To complicate matters, there is in fact a trio of 
foundational elements that Loughlin develops, once we add in the significance of 
the concept of sovereignty and of the marks of sovereign power.33 Sovereignty 
stands as the representation of the autonomy of the political, which requires the 
state as its scheme of intelligibility and sovereign powers to effectuate any right to 
rule; but sovereignty is not integrated into the narrative arc of Foundations. Neither 
is the relation between the marks of sovereignty and concrete order explained in 
Loughlin’s turn to nomos.   
Nomos does, however, intriguingly suggest a new avenue of conceptual-
historical exploration for the adventures of the dialectic of political ordering – the 
material relation among the various orders of the nomos: appropriation, distribution 
and production. To put it differently, it throws open the dynamic of state origin 
and state transformation from the perspective of the evolution of political 
economy and material social relations, to which we can now directly turn.  
 
 
 
      III. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND THE ECONOMIC IN THE 
MATERIAL ORDERING OF THE NOMOS 
 
The threefold concrete order of nomos suggests that the autonomy of the political 
does not (only) depend on the symbolic process of religious disenchantment. It 
also suggests a more complex and dynamic ground than the act of territorial 
                                                      
31 See Loughlin, ‘Nomos’, above.   
32 ibid. The connection of nomos with violence is one reason for Arendt’s ambivalence about the concept, 
and ultimate preference for the Roman lex, which is suggestive of a more dynamic, relational and less 
absolutist conception of origins. For discussion, see M Wilkinson, ‘Between Freedom and Law: 
Hannah Arendt on the Burden of the Tradition’ in Goldoni and MacCorkindale (eds) Hannah Arendt 
and the Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012).  
33 See e.g. M Loughlin, ‘Sovereignty’, chapter 5 of The idea of Public Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003) 
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appropriation alone; a process that integrates the material organisation of 
distributive and productive forces and social relations, the second and third orders 
of nomos.  
But appropriation, distribution and production operate within a capitalist 
economy according to an internal logic of their own, and one that exists in an 
uneasy relation with the autonomy of the political realm. This relation between 
political and economic logics as a feature of nomos is captured by an extension of 
Rosa Luxemburg’s characterisation of the process of imperialist Land-nahme as 
signifying not only literal ‘land-grabbing’ (‘simple robbery’ as Arendt calls it) but 
also metaphorical market expansion, integrating spatial accumulation with 
increasingly intense processes of commodification.  
Luxemburg’s insight suggests a political-economic reconstruction of the 
threefold order of nomos, as well as a related, but distinct, periodisation in contrast 
to Schmitt’s.34 The changing character of nomos reflects the transformation of the 
state from a feudal to a capitalist and later to an imperial organisation of political and 
economic power;35 and even to postmodern types of state power that have 
emerged in the more recent period of informal American empire and economic 
neo-liberalism.36  
The process of political ordering and state development can then be 
internally related (but not reduced) to the logic of capitalist social relations. 
Political ordering operates not just on the initial – or subsequent - forceful 
accumulation, concentration and protection of land (or property), but on a 
continual transformation of social relations, setting ‘in train distinctive imperatives of 
competition, profit-maximisation, the compulsion to reinvest surpluses, and the 
need to improve labour productivity by developing the forces of production.’37 It 
is not only original or ‘primitive’ accumulation (or ‘appropriation’) that sets up the 
economic and social conditions for the market, as Smith, Marx and Weber note, 38 
but also the periodical re-constitution of these conditions through ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ (through re-distribution and re-production of resources by 
political means).39 Social relations are transformed through direct and indirect 
                                                      
34 See R Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (London, Routledge, 2013 [1913]). 
35 Arendt’s endorsement of Rosa Luxemburg’s ‘brilliant insight into the political structure of imperialism’ 
(Origins of Totalitarianism, 148) is interesting because Arendt, like Schmitt, tries to retrieve the Greek idea 
of nomos. Although Schmitt omits discussion of Luxemburg’s updating of Marxism for the imperial age, 
he does, briefly, address Marx’s idea of original appropriation in Nomos of the Earth, 333- 334. He adds, ‘if 
the essence of imperialism lies in the precedence of appropriation before distribution and production, 
then a doctrine such as expropriation of the expropriators is obviously the strongest imperialism, because 
it is the most modern’ 334.  
36 See L Panitch and S Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire 
(London: Verso, 2012). For an exploration of the recent continuation of capitalist land-grabbing, see 
e.g. F. Jamieson, ‘Aesthetics of Singularity’ (2015) New Left Review.  
37 E Wood, ‘Logics of Power: A Conversation with David Harvey’, (2006) Historical Materialism 19 – 20. 
38 The identification of coercive forms of appropriation - whether through domestic corruption, war, or 
in forms of global imperialism (‘political capitalism’) - as central to the formation of the modern state is 
stressed by Max Weber. See e.g. R Swedberg, Max Weber and the Idea of Economic Sociology (1998) 46 - 53.   
39 See D Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 36. 
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forms of intervention which function to commodify and marketise, impose 
competitiveness, austerity or privatisation, or shift private into public debt, and so 
on. The extent to which these processes can still usefully be categorised on the 
basis of traditional class analysis is moot, but the class pedigree of nomos can hardly 
be doubted. As Brunkhorst bluntly puts it, ‘no nomos without class rule’,40 a 
feature of nomos also noted right at its root by Aristotle.41 
The autonomy of the political from the economic is thus a dynamic, two-
sided affair, rather than the one-off rupture from religion sealed by the event of 
secularisation.42 To keep both sides in sight has the advantage of thrusting into 
view the consequences for political ordering of the relative autonomy of the economic, 
which contemporaneously evolves in the modern state. This reveals the state 
‘from the other side’, as it were. These are not parallel developments but 
interlinked; the state might be said to encompass the ‘unity in difference’ of these 
two faces of the political and the economic, public and private. In other words, the 
state, if viewed not only as a secular but as a capitalist formation, is one in which 
the economy (comprising taking, distributing and producing) is relatively autonomous 
from the political, paradigmatically expressed in classical as well as newer forms of 
liberalism in the idea of the self-regulating market, the myth of the invisible hand, 
the sanctity of debt, conditions of perfect competition etc. This develops its own 
set of legal couplings, with property rights, contractual obligations, formal equality 
of status, emerging in the constitution of the modern state and state-system.  As a 
dynamic, it tracks the transformation of social relations of reciprocity and 
solidarity into what Hayek would later call ‘catallactic relations’: relations of 
exchange, based on competition and self-interest. Within this realm, inequality is 
legitimated, justified, or naturalised. It is, in any case, ‘privatised’ and de-
politicised.43 
It is notable that it is not only Marxist and critical political-economic lines 
that are missing from Loughlin’s account of the dynamic of political ordering. 
Foundations’ own conceptual categories are never placed in relation with the 
tradition of classical, neo-classical, ordoliberal or neo-liberal thought that insists on 
naturalising or insulating the ‘laws’ of the private, market sphere, beginning from 
Locke, Smith and Paine but continuing in prominence in the post-war era with the 
group associated with the Mont Pelerin Society.44 The figure of John Locke, who 
arguably grounds this more substantive material account of the modern state (but 
                                                      
40 Brunkhorst, this volume.  
41 For Aristotle, ‘the rule of nomos means the rule of the middle classes as opposed to the rule of the very 
rich, on the one hand, and the rule of the masses or the poor, on the other’, cited in Schmitt, above, 
The Nomos of the Earth. 
42 Whether or not this is, in fact, such a neat and singular rupture is debatable, but need not be explored 
here. See Bomhoff, this volume, for some doubts.  
43 According to Wood, ‘Capitalism alone has created an autonomously economic form of domination’, in 
‘Logics of Power’, above, 13. 
44 See P Mirowski, The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neo-Liberal Thought Collective (Harvard 
University Press, 2009).  
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from a classical liberal perspective, based on individual property rights, and a 
labour theory of ownership) is conspicuous by his absence in Foundations, featuring 
only in regard to his influence on modern understandings of the prerogative 
power.45  
Loughlin, unlike Schmitt (or in different ways Hayek or Oakeshott) does 
not aim to defend a liberal (bourgeois) Rechtsstaat against the perceived 
encroachments of political social democracy.46 Political jurisprudence is thus 
resistant to the Marxist critique (as well as the liberal defence) of political economy 
to the extent that its aim is not to defend an illusive bourgeois order, but to 
account for political order as such, which only contingently depends on the 
workings of a liberal rule of law. The politically disruptive potential of an 
autonomous civil society is also alluded to by Loughlin, albeit rather in passing, 
when taking note of Hegel’s reconstruction, where the market, if left to its own 
devices, would paradoxically tend to increase the need for government, as it would 
exacerbate existing inequalities that would then need to be tempered through 
political means.47 Hegel’s concern for the tendency of bourgeoisie society towards 
inequality and, therefore, instability due to its tendency towards over-accumulation 
at one end and deprivation at the other is captured in his notion of the ‘rabble’, a 
problem of the dispossessed (as well as the ultra-wealthy) that is produced by 
industrial capitalism.48 Although it is one to which Hegel offers no satisfactory 
solution, he captures the nature of the problem, unlike later liberals.  
And yet, for Loughlin, as for Hegel, this problem of inequality - to the 
limited degree it is addressed - is presented entirely from the ‘top-down’. It is 
presented in terms of governing potentia (the capacity to rule) rather than in its 
dynamic with potestas (the right to rule). Potentia emerges as a managerial, top-down 
activity of government rather than a bottom-up struggle for equal rights taking 
place in civil society through social movements and political parties, mediating the 
balance between public goods and private interests.49 Material relations are 
relegated to a technical, administrative machinery of governing in the interest of 
the salus populi – a term which itself flattens out material inequalities, and the 
continuous oscillation between public and private power. The dynamic of potentia 
is not rejoined to its roots as collective power to but restricted to this question of 
                                                      
45 Foundations, 383 – 387.  
46 Perry Anderson, in a masterful essay, groups Schmitt, Hayek and Oakeshott, along with Strauss, as the 
‘Intransigent Right’ of the twentieth century, see P Anderson, ‘The Intransigent Right at the End of the 
Century’ (1992) London Review of Books.  
47 Foundations, 349 – 350.  
48 See F Ruda, Hegel’s Rabble: An Investigation into Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (London, Bloomsbury, 2011). 
49 Although Loughlin makes brief reference to Mortati’s emphasis on political parties (Foundations 397), as 
Brunkhorst puts it: ‘the alternative version of potentia that he had distinguished in Chapter 6 on 
‘Political Jurisprudence’… characterised… as ‘power to’ (with Arendt and Habermas), as distinct from 
‘power over’ (Mann, Foucault) and which is “rooted in the intersubjective generation of solidarity” is 
gradually lost in later chapters.’ (Brunkhorst, this volume) 
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mechanical capacity, despite Loughlin having the resources to reunite it with the 
more emancipatory traditions that draw from Spinoza.50  
The dialectic of capacity and right to rule (the ‘capacity-right nexus’, as 
Loughlin now calls it) tracks the relation between the political and the economic 
not only as a question of governmental power, but also of state (and inter-state) 
formation.51 This is because the constitution of political power – in its relation to 
the economy and vice versa - goes to the question of the governing relationship 
and the set of beliefs on which it rests. In Loughlin’s own terminology, material 
relations go to the question of potestas and the relation between potestas and potentia. 
This is not to deny, of course, that material relations are, to a large extent, 
‘managed’ through governmentality as Loughlin argues, but this view alone misses 
the significance of social movements, political parties, geo-political currents and 
interpersonal social relations in the dynamic of political ordering and disordering. 
These are material forces which constitute and reconstitute beliefs about the ruling 
relationship and about the nature of the demos itself. The idea of equal political 
liberty, a principle apparently central to, but insufficiently articulated in ‘political 
jurisprudence’, does not transpire as a moment of symbolic or normative 
revelation, but unfolds over time; it attracts a different meaning over time through 
democratic movements of solidarity and emancipation as well as capitalist 
movements of competition and domination. 
The Enlightenment trinity of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ rather loses it 
third component for the major part of Foundations – until it re-appears through the 
work of Duguit and his functionalist notion of ‘social solidarity’. But it is disarmed 
of any radical potential. Solidarity is merely a fact of social life in this account, 
losing any emancipatory political quality, divorced from any class or other 
struggles against injustice, domination or exploitation. The project of egalitarian 
solidarity, as Brunkhorst puts it, which emerges from the bottom up as 
communicative ‘power to’ (as a feature of the dialectic of potentia/potestas), is elided 
in Foundations. These movements may well have a functional element, but it is hard 
to see how functionality would guarantee the necessary equilibrium, short of a 
strong, and perhaps improbable, social-biological evolutionary thesis.  
For Loughlin, according to his brief anthropological reconstruction, the 
egalitarian impulse comes, if at all, from the state, in contrast to the natural 
inequalities of man.52 By marginalising the problem of inequality, delegating it to a 
discrete domain of anthropological enquiry, and by presupposing the relative 
autonomy of the political from the economic, rather than reconstructing it and 
problematising its social-historical development, Loughlin’s account is deprived of 
a crucial aspect if not the key to conceptualising the material tensions inherent in 
the actual dynamic of political ordering and – crucially, of disordering.  
                                                      
50 See e.g. M Hardt and A Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). 
51 See now M Loughlin, ‘Erosion of Sovereignty’ (2017) Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 
52 See Foundations, 197 – 198. 
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The broader point is that the political is only relatively autonomous from 
the material composition of society. Material inequalities are not hermetically 
sealed off or fully separated from the political. They pose a challenge not just to 
the necessary stability of the governing arrangements but to the maintenance of 
the political equality on which the autonomy of the political depends, not least 
because of the potential of a hegemonic bloc or idea to dominate or even 
determine the activity and structure of political ordering, or erode politics 
altogether. It should be recalled that the empty place of power depends on a 
political indeterminacy that can only be guaranteed by the praxis of democratic 
struggle. It is achieved, or rather is achievable (since it must be viewed as ongoing), 
through contesting the heteronomy of the market, the alienation of class rule, the 
domination of cultural hierarchy, the subjugation of imperialist coercion. These 
struggles are abstract tussles over the meaning of concepts such as freedom and 
equality, as well as material contests over power and resources, involving 
persuasion, solidarity and often force.  
Loughlin’s metaphor of ‘grammar’, like the concept of ‘reflexivity’, is too 
formal a notion to account for these dynamics and the emergence of competing 
and collective subjects in conditions of inequality.53 This deficiency is common to 
the line of thinking that is so central in Loughlin’s reconstruction of political 
order, from Hobbes through to Schmitt. The Hobbesian-Schmittian 
foregrounding of a ruling relation of ‘protection and obedience’ (despite their 
differences) elides social relations of domination as well as those acts of resistance 
against them that shape the quality of political order. Both aim to overcome 
natural hierarchy, in Hobbes’s case by supposing rough equality between persons, 
in Schmitt’s account by employing the concept of homogeneity. But in so doing 
they naturalise social hierarchies and inequalities of wealth and resources, by 
projecting as a state of nature or as the basic political binary (friend/enemy) what 
is, in fact, a social state of conflict.  
Political jurisprudence makes a similar move, flattening out social relations 
with the concept of ‘political unity’, however reflexive a twist this is given. 
Without any account of the material struggle for and over the autonomy of the 
political – from a dominant economic class, geo-political formations or from 
‘economism’ more generally - the autonomy of the political becomes substantively 
less rich, and, if secularisation is considered to be a fait accompli, ultimately empty.  
At this point, we can bring the democratic character of the modern state 
more sharply into view. This is not merely a normative issue. The relevant 
problem posed by modern democracy is primarily material in nature. It is that the 
democratic dynamic historically (naturally?) expands and extends the demand for 
material goods, and for relative material equality, calling for redistribution or 
changes in the conditions of production. As individuals, groups and classes strive 
for political emancipation in the struggle for universal franchise, for basic political 
                                                      
53 See also Goldoni, this volume.  
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equality, (workers movements, women’s movements, post-colonial movements 
etc.) their demands place exacting material burdens on the governing 
arrangements of the state as well changing the basic ideas of collective autonomy. 
These are not only political struggles narrowly conceived, but struggles for the 
transformation of material social relations, for ‘effective autonomy’, or for us to 
will the means to our collective autonomy, as Castoriadis puts it.54  
These struggles face obstacles, first, to be pursued in a way which respects 
other constitutional principles associated with the advance of liberal ideas of good 
government, historically with the liberal rule of law (or bourgeois Rechtsstaat). The 
political-economic relation exposes how positive public law can come into conflict 
with various imperatives of governmentality, which are themselves directed and 
conditioned by social and political contest. The relationship between state and 
society, the political and the economic, is thus mediated not only by governmental 
policy but by a liberal order which guarantees the conditions for market autonomy 
in an apparently ‘neutral’ manner; private property relations, intellectual property 
guarantees, freedom of contract, conditions of free competition and so on. 
Over the course of the ‘short twentieth century’, as democracy 
increasingly makes it mark as a material force, the political-economic relationship 
is also mediated by the imperatives of the sozial Rechtsstaat, making public matters 
such as welfare, social rights and industrial relations, in an attempt to balance or 
remedy the harsh and potentially disruptive consequences of market society.  
But these democratic material demands are not placed within a vacuum, 
but face the counter-pressure of a capitalist dynamic (whether framed as a 
hegemonic class or bloc or as a representation of ‘market justice’), generated by 
the capacity of a capitalist class to affect the political process, to threaten to 
transfer wealth, withhold or avoid tax, and utilise the conservative machinery of 
the very same liberal legal system to refuse or obstruct structural change to the 
political-economic relation. As Wolfgang Streeck puts it, the modern state has to 
maintain an equilibrium between the Staatsvolk and the Marktvolk that is 
increasingly in tension.55 This is explainable on the basis of the contradictory 
tendencies of democratic capitalism itself – but this explanation is not open to 
Loughlin because of his focus on the imaginary on the one side, and the 
managerial on the other. At root, it is because of his avoidance of any investigation 
into the modern state as a democratic and/or capitalist state, which is the material 
form that the political-economic relation takes in modernity.  
 
 
 
                                                      
54 See C Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy tr. D. Ames (Oxford 
University Press, 1991). Cf. Penner’s chapter in this volume.  
55 See W Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (London: Verso, 2014) 
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   IV.  THE INTERWAR BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC LAW: A CRISIS OF THE STATE 
AND NOT JUST OF GOVERNMENT 
 
From a material perspective, the autonomy of the political is a fragile, ambiguous 
and even illusive achievement, rather than a one-off creation of the modern world, 
‘born of the deepest ever fracture in history’.56 Once the autonomy of the political 
is placed in dialectical relation with the autonomy of the economic, the political 
state with the market state, the material constitution of order and disorder can be 
explored and with it the fragility of public law. This cannot be bracketed as 
relevant only in the exceptional situation when ‘extreme inequality’ or a 
tumultuous rabble makes its presence felt as a political irritant; it is intrinsic to the 
ebb and flow of state transformation, if making its mark most clearly in 
conjunctural moments.  
This precarious process of political ordering reaches breaking point in the 
interwar years, and now returns if not (yet) with quite the same intensity in the 
current crises of democratic capitalism, presented acutely in the recent Euro-crisis, 
but reflected elsewhere. The later set of events of course largely postdates 
Foundations. But it will be suggested here that a diachronic analysis of interwar 
Europe and post-war reconstruction offers an account of the heightened tension 
and collapse followed by a basic re-ordering of the political-economic relation 
crucial to the transformation of public law in the twentieth century.  
It is curious that neither the interwar breakdown of political ordering nor 
its post-war reconstruction is given much attention in Foundations, or indeed in 
Loughlin’s later turn to explore the concept of nomos. And it is a disconcerting 
feature of the narrative of Foundations that recent developments such as those 
associated with the ‘triumph of the social’ get blurred into Duguit’s work from the 
1920’s, skipping the ‘short twentieth century’ in between. 
In the interwar period, the key distinctions on which Foundations builds are 
put under severe stress - between interstate and domestic, between state and 
society, public and private, potestas and potentia. The myth of the state of the ‘long 
19th century’ and the order it represented faced extreme pressures, an order in 
crisis if not in terminal decline.57 The problem for an approach to political 
ordering which prioritises nomos as land appropriation in this context is apparent; 
Schmitt himself considered the modern jus publicum Europaeum to have been 
displaced, because land was no longer the ‘clear-cut ground for political and 
economic organisation’, even though political and legal thinking remained mired in 
the ‘older elemental presuppositions’.58  
The second phase of the nomos of the jus publicum Europeaum had reached 
its end game with the First World War. Schmitt would later speculate that the 
                                                      
56 Foundations, 7, citing Gauchet. 
57 B Teschke, ‘Fatal Attraction’, above, 187 
58 G Balakrishnan, ‘Geopolitics of Separation’ (2012) New Left Review, 68 
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chaos brought about with the end of British Empire and the disintegration of the 
inter-state Westphalian order it loosely underwrote could only properly be 
resolved if the world was reorganised into continental blocks underpinned by 
large-scale transnational economic orders. When German hegemony failed to 
materialise, Schmitt turned his attention to the emerging American empire with its 
liberal universalist ideology and the technical means to extend its global influence, 
including control of air power. As Loughlin himself puts it: ‘in place of European 
powers determining the spatial order of the world, during the 20th century the 
world determined the spatial order of Europe’, a reversal that signals a new stage 
in the evolution of the nomos of the Earth.59  
But rather than merely signifying geo-elemental or geo-political shifts, the 
interwar breakdown of political order and its post-war resettlement must be 
reconstructed on the basis of the political-economic relation in terms of the 
tension between democracy and capitalism. Without discounting the importance 
of regional and global re-orientations, it is the threat posed by democracy and 
capitalism as real social forces that threatens to disrupt the political-economic 
relation in a way that is salient for political jurisprudence.  
All that can be offered here is a brief and stylised reconstruction of this 
interregnum. There is, of course, a much longer background dynamic involved. 
The conservative fear of popular emancipation is presaged in an earlier epoch; 
evident from Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and the ‘democratic 
revolutions’ of 1871, and 1848, and even earlier with the Rousseauvian influence 
on the Jacobins.60 But for interwar conservative liberals, such as Schmitt, the 
question of how the process of democratisation could be made safe for liberal 
economics had become immediately pressing for domestic political reasons (allied 
to the threat posed by the Bolshevik revolution).  
Interwar pressure on the established political-economic relation of 
classical liberalism comes from two directions - from unfettered market power 
leading to monopoly capitalism and ultimately Fascist dictatorship on the one 
hand, and from unfettered democracy leading to socialism, common ownership of 
the means of production and the loss of the relative autonomy of the economic on 
the other. Both threaten the normal workings of distribution and production in 
the liberal market economy, threatening to fundamentally reshape the relation 
between the political and the economic of the ‘long 19th century’. The threat to the 
old political order emerged, in other words, in relation to internal as much as 
external ‘enemies’ of the existing state and state-system of the jus publicum 
Europeaum. 
Political equality – hitherto merely a formal presupposition of liberal social 
contract theory - becomes materially significant in the interwar period both as a 
                                                      
59 Loughlin, ‘Nomos’, above.  
60 See e.g. M Goldoni, ‘Rousseau’s Radical Constitutionalism and its Legacy’ in M Dowdle and M 
Wilkinson (eds.) Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism (Cambridge, CUP, 2017).  
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force of social and economic change, and as a new basis for claims of legitimate 
authority. This is a general phenomenon, but a focus on Weimar Germany 
sharpens the issues. As a social force, democracy is liberated and strengthened 
through the grant of universal suffrage (guaranteed for the first time in German 
history by the Weimar constitution itself), and by intense party politics and 
parliamentary democracy, the rise of local and regional claims to autonomy, 
including worker’s councils and other movements of economic democracy.  
For Schmitt, the welfare state, the ‘quantitatively total state’, colonised by 
interest groups and associations, would be a deformation of the classic liberal 
‘neutral state’ of the 19th century.61 Actually existing pluralism, seen through 
Hobbesian eyes, was one step away from a condition of civil war within which 
there would be no judge to determine ‘mine’ and ‘thine’, threatening the 
disintegration of bourgeois society.62  
The emancipatory potential of class-consciousness combined with 
universal suffrage raised the possibility for full political control over the economy 
– threatening the balance between the political and the economic and precipitating 
a crisis of political ordering and of public law itself. As an ideological matter, 
democracy becomes increasingly central to constitutional theory through the 
linking of legitimate authority with democratic procedure (coincident with the 
associated rise of legal positivism).63  
All were subject to Schmitt’s fierce polemic. But above all, it was social 
democracy that threatened his position because it called into question not only 
how socio-economic conflicts should be mediated through structures of 
‘government’ (potentia) but the basic relationship of state and society, central to the 
established category of the right to rule (potestas). The very idea of the General Will 
– which eliminates the right of resistance in classical social contract thought - 
became threatening with the politically active population no longer a discreet and 
homogenous male bourgeoisie. The problem that democratic emancipation and 
class struggle posed for the politically conservative and economically liberal 
Schmitt was apparent: ‘in a democratic age it was entirely possible that a legislature 
based on universal suffrage could chip away at the rules of property and contract 
which regulate the intercourse of bourgeoisie society.’64  It threatened the 
governing relationship, the remodelling of the idea of the political order of the 
state and of the people who constituted it. What for Sieyes’ was the ‘third estate’, 
                                                      
61 See K Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse 1750 – 1950 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) 179 – 180. 
62 G Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London, Verso, 2002) 124. ‘In 
Schmitt’s view’ Balakrishnan notes, ‘the polycratic, corporatist, welfare state threatened the existence of 
the state as a higher power standing above society, or even as a neutral power standing impartially 
between the major social classes’ (at 104). 
63 Schmitt thus considered authoritarianism a necessary antidote both to the fragmentary processes of 
democratisation and pluralisation, which were weakening the German state and endangering its 
Constitution, and to the relativism of a legal positivism without substance, personified in the figure of 
Hans Kelsen and his Pure Theory of Law. 
64 G Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 98 
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which was nothing and shall become everything, potentially becomes the working 
class. This was Schmitt’s fear: 
 
Now the proletariat becomes the people, because it is the bearer of this 
negativity. It is the part of the population which does not have property, does 
not participate in the productive majority, and finds no place in the existing 
order… Democracy becomes a proletarian democracy, and eliminates the 
liberalism of the propertied and educated bourgeoisie.65  
 
How could the normal political-economic relation be protected or reinvented in 
the political turbulence of late Weimar? For Schmitt, as for many other 
conservatives (with the notable exception of Austrian economic liberals), it was 
impossible to envisage any straightforward return to laissez-faire, a ‘night 
watchman state’ in the vein of Hayek and other conservative liberals and later 
libertarians across the Atlantic; the restoration of the relationship between the 
political and economic could be achieved only with a temporary (or more 
permanent) suspension of legal order by commissarial dictatorship, violating the 
separation between politics and economics in order to restore it. If the democratic 
movement of the autonomy of the political threatened the capitalist state (viz. the 
relative autonomy of the economic), then militant protection was required to defeat it. 
What was required was, in his view, an authoritarian state.  
The significance of this new authoritarianism is apparent in Schmitt’s 
address in November 1932 to an association of German industrialists, the Langnam 
Verein: ‘Strong state, free economy’,66 in which he advocates a robust autonomous 
economic order, as a third category in addition to and separate from the state and 
the individual entrepreneur (or ‘private sphere’).67 In this model, economics must 
become neither totally politicised, as recommended by social democrats, nor 
totally privatised, as urged in classical liberalism. But above all, it must not be 
subject to the forces of democracy. 
Hermann Heller, Schmitt’s social democratic protagonist in late Weimar, 
saw with great clarity the authoritarian nature of the political formation that 
Schmitt was defending. To grasp its full significance, a reaction to the inherent 
instability of political order in a society that is both democratic and capitalist, 
Heller takes a longer-view of the ebbs and flows of 19th and early 20th century 
                                                      
65 C Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, tr. J Seitzer (Durham, NC, Duke university Press, 2008) 271- 272. 
66 Se R Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy (University of Wales Press, 
1998). Schmitt permitted its reprinting at least twice, suggesting for W Scheuerman that it was a text 
that was of some significance to him, see Carl Schmitt and the End of Law (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) 
288.   
67 The demand for autonomous economic administration would complement and overlap the third form of 
institutional juristic thought he was concurrently developing, based on concrete order, influenced by 
French jurist, Hauriou. See K Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty and the Rule of Law: From 
Political to Economic Constitutionalism’ (2001) 8 Constellations 442 – 460.  
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liberalism, and its strange mutation into a form of ‘conservative liberalism’.68 In 
the 19th century, the conservative, reactionary forces protecting the feudal order 
had put up fierce, if uneven, resistance to the pressures of liberalism and capitalist 
modernisation. Although largely unsuccessful, not all their efforts went 
unrewarded, as conservatives managed to inculcate into the bourgeoisie political 
sensibilities that produced a ‘peculiar feudal capitalist inter-breeding’, labelled 
‘national liberalism’. The reverse process was now taking place, in Heller’s view, as 
the forces of conservatism were marshalled in defence of liberal capitalism and 
against any forms of solidarity. ‘Matching this sociological transformation, the 
“authoritarian” state represents a further development of national liberalism. Most 
appropriately it is, Heller concludes, ‘to be addressed as authoritarian liberalism’.69  
The designation of the political order is justified in Heller’s view because 
of its position vis-à-vis the ‘cardinal problem’ of the present, ‘the question of the 
economic order’, prescribing, as it does, a strict separation of politics and the 
economy. Mutual bonds, rather than being urged to resist the pressures of liberal 
modernisation, must now be ‘loosened’, at least regarding socio-economic 
matters.70 The primary object of the authoritarian liberals was the elimination of 
social democracy from politics and the defence of an autonomous economic 
sphere, not through laissez-faire, but through intervention. 
Loughlin’s insistence on neutralising Heller, suggesting that he adopted a 
‘highly abstract’ conception of constituent power, is puzzling.71 It is not only that 
this elides Heller’s active part in the German Social Democratic Party as antagonist 
of Schmitt, which is clearly at the surface of his political writings in Weimar; it is 
that these commitments are essential in Heller’s view for stabilising the 
constitutional dialectic itself. In an era of actual democracy, with full participation, 
the material prospect of socio-economic equality in addition to the symbolic 
integration of society is required for the constitutional state to function, to obtain 
enduring political legitimacy; in its absence, the tendency will be to turn to 
authoritarian alternatives, whether of Left or Right. 
For the process of political ordering in a democracy there must be some 
prospect of substantive equality ‘between rulers and ruled’, even though Heller 
doubts that this can ever be truly and finally achieved, because the social structure 
                                                      
68 H Heller, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism’ tr. from 1932 (2015) European Law Journal. 
69 ibid 
70 Ibid. 
71 See M Loughlin, ‘On Constituent Power’ in Dowdle and Wilkinson (eds.) above, 170. Loughlin is not 
alone in marginalising Heller’s substantive commitments. Dyzenhaus makes the same move in his book 
on Heller, Schmitt and Kelsen, underplaying both Schmitt’s economic liberalism and Heller’s 
democratic socialism, see D Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermman 
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is ‘necessarily antagonistic’.72 This antagonism, for Heller, is fully material in nature 
due to the dynamics of a capitalist economy. But in Heller’s vision, material 
inequality is ultimately fatal to political order: the prospect at least of relative 
socio-economic equality is required for the stability of the governing relation. It is 
for political democracy to work this through peacefully, with the aid of political 
parties, who are able to unite a multitude of wills into a singular voice.  
To refocus political ordering with a view to its broader reintegration with 
political economy and the issue of inequality, we can turn to the work of Karl 
Polanyi, whose account of the great transformation of industrial capitalism, and 
the resulting political and social reaction to its dis-embedding of social relations 
mirrors Heller’s own reflections and over the longue durée.  
In Polanyi’s account, the modern nation-state exists and evolves in dialectical 
relation with the modern market economy.73 If the modern nation-state operates 
according to a logic of political equality and solidarity, the modern market 
economy functions on the basis of material inequality and competition. These two 
distinct logics exist in a perpetual tension, captured by the Polanyian figure of the 
‘market society’. The commodification of the ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, 
money and labour (dis-embedding that which must remain embedded in society) 
thus produces a reaction, when society tries to protect itself from the harsh 
consequences of marketisation, a reaction which may be spontaneous as well as 
organised. The form this response takes varies greatly depending on the strength 
of the democratic culture of the society – where this has been hollowed out by 
forms of authoritarianism, and where spontaneous reaction has been obstructed 
by political power, society may be too weak to prevent an eventual extreme 
response. This explains the interwar breakdown of liberal constitutionalism, when 
forced economic liberalisation and rigid adherence to austerity ultimately produces 
a ‘double movement’ of dramatic social and ultimately political reactions. 
Polanyi notes how this dialectic plays out in geopolitical as well as 
domestic relations; politics could be made submissive to the economy by external 
constraints on the democratic process. Particularly significant in Polanyi’s account, 
is the attempt in the 1920’s to restore the Gold Standard, submitting politics to an 
overwhelming ‘economic rationality’, in an attempt to protect currency stability.74 
It was no coincidence, for Polanyi, that those countries which extricated 
themselves from Gold, regaining monetary control, and their status as ‘masters not 
servants of the currency’,75 were better able to respond to economic 
                                                      
72 H Heller, ‘Political Democracy and Social Homogeneity’ from A Jacobson and B Schlink (eds.) Weimar: 
A Jurisprudence of Crisis (University of California Press, 2002) 257. The dialectic of fact and norm is, in a 
democracy more than elsewhere, dependent on, and shaped by ‘social equalisation’, Heller, above, 261. 
73 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, Beacon Press, 
2001 (1944)). 
74 Ibid, at 236 
75 ibid, 242 
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circumstances, to rebalance social relations without departing from the essence of 
liberal democratic politics.76   
To return to Loughlin’s nomos, there is a suggestive analogy between 
Polanyi’s three ‘fictitious commodities’ – land, money and labour – and the three-
fold ordering of nomos: appropriation, distribution and production. It suggests that 
the autonomy of the political depends on maintaining democratic control over 
these ‘non-commodities’, or at least the political capacity to condition society 
against market forces and the capitalist economic logic of accumulation, 
distribution and production that acts upon them. The interwar interregnum 
specifically shows that the process of political ordering hinges on a political-
economic relation that is in a delicate balance between the antagonist material 
forces of capitalism and democracy and that public law is subject to the vagaries of 
this conflict as well as marking its shifting boundaries.  
 
 
 
     V.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE, NOT JUST THE GOVERNMENT: 
POTESTAS IN THE POST-WAR CONSTITUTIONAL IMAGINATION 
 
But could the democratic capitalist state – the relative autonomy of the political and of 
the economic - be restored in the post-war period if instead of democratisation, 
institutions were turned towards ensuring the economic sphere functioned on the 
basis of free competition? If the focus of public law shifted to securing equality in 
the marketplace, preventing monopolies and cartels, and ensuring economic 
freedom, might Heller’s and Polanyi’s lessons, and the democratic struggles for 
material equality, be forgotten? 
Schmitt’s motto of the ‘free economy’ requiring the ‘strong state’ – the 
maintenance of the material conditions of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat – would be 
taken up and reformulated by the Freiberg ordoliberals. They, unlike Schmitt, were 
concerned as much with the perceived dangers of monopoly capitalism as with 
socialism,77 fearing the impact of monopolisation and cartelisation on economic 
freedom as much as the ‘irrationality’ of social democracy. The ordoliberals were 
more consistent than Schmitt, taking note of the threat to political order from the 
other side, as it were, from the dysfunctionality of capitalist logic in a relatively 
                                                      
76 According to Polanyi, the political dispossession of Wall Street by going off gold (Roosevelt did so 
almost immediately on gaining power in 1933) was the key to preventing the occurrence in the US of a 
‘social catastrophe of the continental type’, ibid, 238. 
77 On the links between authoritarian liberalism, Carl Schmitt, and ordoliberalism, see W Bonefeld, 
‘Freedom and the Strong State: On Ordoliberalism (2011) New Political Economy. It was Franz Neumann’s 
classic text on National Socialism, Behemoth, published in 1941 that described National Socialism as 
‘Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism’ and Neumann who, long before ordoliberalism, had already doubted 
whether the legal institutions of capitalist economy can perform their functions where the market is 
subordinated to the power of monopolists, developing the idea of an ‘Economic Constitution’ to counter 
this. For discussion, see K Tribe, above, 174.  
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autonomous economy. From their perspective, the strong state had to be 
equipped with independent institutions capable of intervening if necessary to 
ensure the conditions of fair competition and a free market. The ordoliberals 
made a new attempt at a differentiation of politics and economics based on the 
political decision for a liberal economic order, backed by constitutional guarantees 
and institutional protections. The free market machine does not run itself; once 
started it requires constant oiling through the supervisory mechanisms of the state. 
But this was not a vision of a vibrant democratic state. In the jargon of 
post-war European reconstruction, it was ‘restrained democracy’ (a post-war 
reflection of the inappositely named ‘militant democracy’),78 encapsulated in the 
story of West German post-war constitutional development: ‘we are (afraid of) the 
people’.79  
This vision goes, not only to the functional question of governmental 
powers, but to the very idea of the governing relationship, of the nature and limits 
of the right to rule over the economy.  Indeed, the ideological and constitutional 
significance of ordoliberalism is identified as early as 1955, with Carl Joachim 
Friedrich noting that it signals a fundamental re-ordering of the basic ideas 
underpinning constitutional theory.80 As Friedrich understood, and as Foucault 
would later explore in his lectures on neo-liberal governmentality in 1979, the 
decisive theoretical turn triggered by ordoliberalism had been to replace 
constituent power (or popular sovereignty) with individual economic freedom — a 
freedom to participate in the market — as the legitimating device for the whole 
constitutional order.81 
If to put the law above man, as Rousseau quipped, ‘il faudrait des dieux’ 
(one would need Gods), the ordoliberals answered the call for a new set of elites, 
who, confounding Rousseau, could, like Gods, finally ‘give laws to men’.82 The 
means to achieve this was a new understanding of economic constitutionalism, 
protecting the free market against democratic as well as capitalist interference.  
This was not just a departure but a reversal of its original intent, the idea of an 
economic constitution prefigured by Frankfurt school theorists Franz Neumann 
and Hugo Sinzheimer had signified democratic control of the economic structures 
of society; it was a labour constitution.83  
The new economic constitutionalism, based on formal equality, and 
individual economic rights would mean the complete abolition of class conflict 
                                                      
78 J W Müller, Contesting Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
79 See C Möllers, ‘We are (afraid of) the People: Constituent Power in German Constitutional Thought’, 
in M Loughlin and N Walker (eds) The Paradox of Constitutionalism.  
80 C J Friedrich, ‘The Political Thought of Neo-liberalism’, American Political Science Review 49 (1955); 
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics — Lectures at the College de France 1978–1979 (New York, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008) 
81 Friedrich, ibid. 
82 Cf Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London, Penguin, 1958), 184. 
83 See R Dukes, The Labour Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 2o12).  
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from the political domain.84 The class-conscious democratic struggles of the 
interwar period would be repressed in order to secure political and economic 
stability. The new civil religion was fiscal prudence, efficiency and competition.  
Although it was far from straightforwardly applied, ordoliberalism’s 
particular constitutional prescriptions represented a reconfiguration of the 
constitutional imagination, specifically regarding the political-economic relation. 
Its ideological linkage of neoclassical market economics and liberal 
constitutionalism would become a key conceptual plank in the process of 
European integration.85  The ordoliberal legacy could be seen, for example, in how 
the self-understandings of constitutional actors in Europe (in particular the ECJ 
and the European Commission) became increasingly conditioned by ideologies 
and interests that corresponded to the pressures of economic rationality and the 
logic of market competition. These trends become more acute in time, particularly 
after the Treaty of Maastricht, and of course extend far beyond the EU. The 
economic neo-liberalism that is captured in the literature on the ‘new 
constitutionalism’ can be understood as a direct descendent of ordoliberalism’s 
critique of the dangers of constituent power and democracy.86  
Foundations addresses neither ordoliberalism nor European integration in 
any detail. But this is entirely consistent with Loughlin’s avoidance of any political-
economic conceptualisation of the dynamic of state development, from Locke 
through to Polanyi. European integration thus features only in the very closing 
part of Foundations and is there presented as affecting only the category of potentia 
in the limited sense of governmentality. The final chapter of Foundations entitled 
‘the new architecture of public law’ examines the growth of the administrative 
state, and this includes the impact of the EU, but only in so far as it modifies our 
understanding of ‘government’, and not of ‘State’ or ‘Constitution’.87 
Loughlin’s reluctance to extend his dialectical approach to political 
ordering to the project of European integration leads him to suggest that the 
changes reflected by it are merely super-structural and, elsewhere, to insist that the 
formal right to leave means that potestas is basically untouched.88 In the vernacular 
of public law, sovereignty can entail membership of the European Union or exit 
from it, now in accordance with a Treaty to which each Member State is bound 
(Article 50, TFEU). Just as the constituent power to change the constitutional 
direction from ordoliberalism towards socialism theoretically remains, the 
governmental powers that are channelled through European institutions can be 
                                                      
84 See E V Bonn, Standard Texts on Social Market Economy: Two Centuries of Discussion (ed. Horst Friedrich 
Wunsche) tr. Derek Rutter (Stuttgart, Gustav Fisher Verlag, 1982) ix.  
85 Steph Dullien and Ulrike Guérot, ‘The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germany’s Approach to the 
Euro-crisis’ European Council of Foreign Relations 49 (2012).   
86 See Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic 
Constitutionalism’, Constellations 8 (2001): 442.  
87 Foundations, 435 - 467. 
88 See e.g. M Loughlin, ‘Why Sovereignty’ in R Rawlings, P Leyland, and A Young (eds.) Sovereignty and the 
Law (Oxford, Hart, 2013).  
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reclaimed. The channelling of authority occurs in accordance with a constitution 
that can itself be changed by the constituent power of the nation. There is thus a 
way to reconcile ordoliberalism, as well as European integration, with the 
autonomy of the political realm. For both, strictly speaking, it remains a political 
decision that is the basis for the economic or supranational constitutional 
arrangements.  
But once politics is reduced to a single political-economic logic, and the 
possibility of genuine renewal comes down to the possibility of exercising the 
constituent power, the autonomy of the political is reduced to a bare formality or 
the prospect of a revolutionary rupture. Constituent power might even be 
temporarily absorbed into a new regime of constituted power, based on 
constitutional rights, protected by constitutional courts, or managed by other 
institutions.  
This reversal is captured in the discourse of ‘de-politicisation’, where 
issues of appropriation, distribution and production are increasingly taken out of 
the public political sphere of contestation, and determined by market logic, or the 
technocratic bodies who are supposed to replicate it. The process of de-
politicisation (which would better be termed ‘de-democratisation’) can even be 
constitutionalised, as in the Eurozone, with the structural and institutional 
prescriptions of Economic and Monetary Union in the Treaty of Maastricht, and 
defended by the European Central Bank and Court of Justice. But it can also be 
channelled through political ideology, such as in the refrain that ‘There is no 
alternative’ to neo-liberal structural reform (so-called TINA).  
The post-war shifting of boundaries between the political and the 
economic is especially evident in public law’s constitutionalist variant, where not 
only a private micro-economic sphere, but increasingly a macro-economic sphere 
is insulated from politics through legal-institutional means – with constitutional 
courts, central banks and supranational institutions increasingly determining 
political principles and conditioning political outcomes.89 And what must be 
captured is not only formal channelling but constitutionalism’s framing function, 
the way a constitution (understood broadly) establishes not just how political 
debate is to be organised, but what its limits are.90  
Potestas is not captured by formal possibilities alone; it integrates an 
element of subjective belief about the right to rule, in combination with the 
perceived capacity to govern. Ordoliberalism and European integration do not 
only set in motion a series of new institutions and governmental arrangements. 
Contrary to what Foundations suggests, these reflect and in turn reconstitute a 
deeper set of beliefs about the governing relationship. There has been not only a 
                                                      
89 See e.g. K Tuori and K Tuori, The Eurocrisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge, CUP, 2013).  
90 As Gavin Anderson puts it, ‘constitutional discourse is always more than the rules it generates or 
legitimates... setting the parameters not just for how politics is contested, but what is deemed politically 
contestable’. See G. Anderson, in S Gill, New Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge, CUP, 2015) 
283, quoting Christodoulidis. 
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‘quantitative’ change in governing activities, an increase in delegation and pooling 
of governmental powers, but a ‘qualitative’ shift in the political constitution of the 
state, a transformation of the basic idea of the right to rule itself. It is, in other 
words, in relation to potestas as much as potentia that the post-war constitutional 
imagination is reborn, a structural reconfiguration of the state, as a new ideal type 
of political-economic community, albeit one whose lineages can be traced back to 
ideas associated with classical liberalism. According to Giandomineco Majone: 
 
The possibility of separating economics and politics was a key, if implicit, 
assumption of the founders of the EEC. It was not a new idea but rather a 
return to a classical liberal tenet which in the nineteenth century and up to 
world war I had made it possible for the world economy to develop in such a 
fashion that “between national and international economic integration there 
was only a difference in degree but not in kind”.91  
 
To fully capture integration as part of this process of state transformation, Chris 
Bickerton’s analysis is useful, not least since he builds on Loughlin’s own schema 
as outlined in Foundations. Drawing on integration studies and work in critical 
political economy, Bickerton conceptualises the transformation of the ‘nation-
state’ into a ‘member state’ as a feature of membership of the EU.92 He argues that 
European integration, in a second phase (after the post-war trentes glorieuses) 
beginning in the mid-late 1970’s, has transformed the state by transforming, or 
more specifically, opposing (rather than uniting) state – society relations, 
separating the state and its sovereign power from the popular will. This is because, 
regarding the limiting of national power – central to the modern constitutional 
imagination - European integration ‘is different from the acts of self-binding by 
the modern state: ‘[t]he active subject, namely the people, is not doing the 
binding’.93 This reflects not just a superficial change to the ‘architecture of public 
law’ or to the category of potentia but a dismantling of the social contract or the 
right to rule:  
 
Constraints upon the exercise of national power are based not upon a 
political ideal or principle but rather on an institutional and bureaucratic 
understanding of such limits. The picture we thus have of the member 
state… is one of administrative machine rather than a political community. 
We are in the realm of what Engels called ‘the administration of things.94 
 
The constitutional re-imagination of neo-liberalism is wide-ranging. Political and 
social identity is fragmented, increasingly commodified and quantified as merely 
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consisting of a particular collection of individualist tastes and preferences. The 
citizen is replaced by a simple consumer of economic benefits. And in terms of 
the political responsiveness of the new ‘debt state’ and its institutions in this 
period, the constituency that matters is no longer the Statsvolk but the Marktsvolk, 
‘inaugurating a new stage in the relationship between democracy and capitalism’.95 
The dominant means for the state to collect resources shifts from reliance on its 
citizens through direct taxation, to reliance on financial investors in the global 
marketplace.  
These changes, of course, were only fully realised in the context of 
momentous geopolitical, political and ideological shifts that transform Europe at 
the end of the ‘short twentieth century’, marked with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. But the neo-liberal phase, on the view offered here, represents an 
exaggeration of post-war trends rather than a departure from them. European 
integration, right from its initial formation, is properly conceived as a response to the 
series of interwar dynamics sketched above, both reflecting and helping to set in 
train a process of state transformation based on restrained democracy (and 
tempered by restrained capitalism).  
This is a complex and uneven process, and each country stands in a 
different material relation with the project of integration, making conceptual 
generalisation problematic. Thus, the British relationship to the project is quite 
different from the ‘founding six’ (Germany, Italy, France and Benelux), as well as 
the post-Fascist Mediterranean accessions and post-Communist entries, not only 
geo-politically, institutionally and culturally, but also temporally – joining at the 
end of the Golden Age of Keynesian governmentality rather than at the beginning 
of post-war reconstruction or the end of the Cold War. But abstracting from these 
significant differences, and to adopt Loughlin’s own conceptual dichotomy, the 
changes inaugurated by the project of restrained democracy go not only to the 
question of potentia, but also to the question of potestas (and to the dynamic relation 
between potestas and potentia). It reflects a change in this basic dynamic not because 
of any return of the religious as a threat to the autonomy of the political, but 
because the right to rule is no longer extended to those who would fundamentally 
question the differentiation of the political and the economic as demanded in the 
new post-war order of liberal political economy, and in which European 
integration plays a central and increasingly prominent role.  
To put it (too) bluntly, in the post-war constitutional settlement the 
Communist Party of Germany does not have the right to rule, at least not 
according to the German Constitutional Court.96 But neither can the right to rule 
include the right to relinquish a commitment to the project of European 
                                                      
95 See e.g. Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time (London: Verso, 2014), 79–88.  
96 See D Kommers and R Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durham, 
NC, Duke University Press, 2012), 291. A more informal bargain might be identified in the 
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Eurocommunism of continental European communist parties.  
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integration, now updated to exclude any questioning of the single currency as 
representing the fate of the continent (‘if the Euro fails, Europe fails’). On the 
other hand, nor can the government ‘surrender’ the right to rule over ‘essential 
state tasks’ to the EU, as the Lisbon ruling of the German Constitutional Court 
would later insist, precluding the development of a European federal state.97  
The post-war reconstitution of the modern state is not just an attempt to 
tame the passions unleashed in the interwar period through various regimes of 
governmentality. It reflects a basic re-orientation of the constitutional imagination 
and a new ground of legitimate authority, an inversion even of the relation 
between the political and the economic, based on the primacy of the economic. 
Although this is far from an irreversible formation - and it will come to generate 
new sets of tensions between the political and the economic, democracy and 
capitalism, that continue to reverberate – it marks a transformation in the 
constitution of the state and state-system. 
The European project is integral to this resetting of the political-economic 
relation. But its political form is ambiguous. To this day, it remains in limbo: not a 
mere international organisation, but neither a fully-fledged federal super-state. In 
fact, it bears a strong resemblance to Schmitt’s notion of a federation or Bund, a 
form that is inherently unstable in Schmitt’s view.98  
Of course, the formal right to leave the EU exists, marking it as distinct 
from the normal federation. But leaving would represent a material re-constitution 
of the state, particularly for those in the Eurozone. To be sure, sovereignty, held in 
abeyance, suspended in the post-war European federal construct, is now back on 
the agenda. Is there a better expression of the desire for a reclaiming of politics 
vis-à-vis the economic than the conditions surrounding ‘Brexit’? And yet if the 
event shows the relative autonomy of the political, the difficulty in acting on it 
reveals the relative autonomy of the political. 
This cannot be more fully developed here, but the point should be clear 
enough: the crisis of the contemporary state and the regional state-system in 
Europe is fully material in nature, and revolves around the political-economic 
struggles between democracy and capitalism, as much within as between states, in 
a reprisal, albeit in different conditions, of the interwar interregnum. 99 This is why 
the fragility of public law returns in plain sight.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
If Hegel represents the last standard-bearer of an idealist political jurisprudence, 
Schmitt marks its twilight, providing the clearest sense that the modern dialectic of 
potestas and potentia is marked by significant discontinuities, and even rupture. This 
emerges forcefully in the interwar era but reverberates beyond, into the post-war 
reconstruction of the European state and state-system. It is far from being 
resolved, as that reconstruction now comes under sustained pressure in the recent 
period of crises.  
Loughlin’s turn to nomos in order to provide firmer ground for the 
foundations of public law is indicative of a renewed period of tension in the 
contemporary state form – when, again, its ability to maintain political order is 
placed in question. This turn is material but in a quite specific and limited way, 
maintaining public law’s distance from any reconnection with the tradition of 
political-economy (either classical liberal or critical-Marxist).100 Without any 
account of the political-economy and geo-politics of the threefold ordering of 
nomos, land appropriation simply becomes a material mirror-image of the 
Kelsenian presupposition, a Grund-nomos. For Loughlin, gesturing towards a more 
reflexive account than Schmitt,101 nomos continues to evolve, because the state 
expresses ‘the dynamic emergence of political unity, of the process of constantly 
renewed formation and emergence of this unity from a fundamental or ultimately 
effective power or energy.’102 Energy, of course, cannot be created or destroyed, 
but only transformed. But from what, and into what? And what opposing material 
forces does political energy encounter?  
According to Loughlin, the most basic purpose of the practices of modern 
public law was that of maintaining the civil peace against a backdrop of (often 
violent) competing truths.’103 Auctoritas non veritas facet legem, as Hobbes taught. But 
what were these truths about?  
It is not only ‘truths’ that are competing, but also material and ideological 
interests and relations, and they are in constant motion. Reflexivity cannot do the 
necessary work of capturing this dynamic. The meaning of the political equality 
that is required to generate reflexive order in practice is never elaborated by 
Loughlin, nor are the material reasons for its fragility in a market society explored. 
The key conceptual-historical argument advanced here is that the dynamic of 
political ordering is conditioned by the material relation between democracy and 
capitalism as real social forces. The advantage of foregrounding this political-
economic relation as a matter of state formation is that it brings us closer to what 
the processes and institutions of public law actually do, closer to how this relation 
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is materially constituted and regulated, as well as how public law can be threatened 
by it, from capitalism on the one side, and democracy on the other.  
Processes of political and economic ordering take place across two 
spheres, which are only relatively autonomous from one another. To maintain the 
relative autonomy and primacy of the political requires a degree of democratic 
political control over the economy and our material social relations. It is the 
autonomy of the political realm that allows politics to occur, to permit political 
contest between different economic models or substantive social goals, for 
example, or to reorganise or recondition the taking, distribution and production of 
land and resources. But this control can be lost, eroded or at least marginalised 
through the hegemony of particular political-economic structures, ideas and 
interests in a capitalist society and state-system. It can also be regained by struggles 
for the relative autonomy of the political realm, through movements that build on 
and generate solidarity and co-operation. Would it not be imprudent to reduce 
struggles for equal liberty to a matter of functional or scientific logic alone? 
 
 
 
